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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional interest to officers of the naval service. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Naval War College. 
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REQUIREMENTS FOR WORLD LEADERSHIP 
A lecture delivered by 
Hon. John Nicholas Brown 
at the Naval War College 
December 19, 1949 
When I was first written to, many months ago, asking if I 
would give a lecture to the Naval War College class, on the "Re­
quirements for World Leadership", I confess that the task seemed 
quite beyond me, because I am neither a college professor nor am 
I a military expert. And, furthermore, the requirements for world 
leadership seemed to me so dif
f
icult to analyze and so difficult to 
trace in proper relation, one to the other, that my first inclination 
was to write as polite a letter as I could and say, "No, thank you". 
But, when I realized the honor which was inherent in the invitation, 
and when I recalled that my experience with the navy and with 
the members of the War College classes in the past had all lead 
me to believe that they were kind in their criticisms, I decided to 
risk it. 
Today it is a truism to state that the United States of Amer­
ica has world leadership--challenged, yes, but nevertheless, ours. 
And in thinking on what basis that world leadership shall be main­
tained, I have attempted to set down briefly a few remarks which 
I hope you will consider. 
In the beginning I would like to start with a document--a 
document of perhaps an unusual character because it is not only 
current-that is to say-new, but also new from the point of 
view of the age of those who wrote it. 
The Honorable John Nicholas Brown was former Assistant Secre­
tary of the Navy for Air. He is one of New England's outstanding 
citizens and is a member of numerous boards and societies. 
1 
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I do not know if you are familiar with a publication called 
"The Next Voter". "The Next Voter" entitles itself, "A New 
Venture in Political Commentary" and is written, edited, and pub­
lished twice monthly by the students of the Political Science Course 
at Brooks School, North Andover, Mass. These are boys of the 
High School age. This publication has had a good deal of inter­
esting comment by the newspapers and also by some of our lead­
ers. The last issue, the December issue, contains as a lead edi­
torial the following-and I will, with your permission, read part 
of it to you. The school boys start as follows: 
2 
"It is interesting though rather futile to speculate by 
which epithet the first half of the twentieth century will 
be known. We have won two wars and lost two peaces. 
We have experienced the rise and only partial fall of two 
new anti-God religions. We have witnessed the failure 
of the League of Nations, and have not yet seen the suc­
cess of the United Nations. Fantastic dreams of the 19th 
century have become practical realities in the 20th: radio, 
television, air-communication, and atomic energy. 
"The United States has abandoned the Monroe Doctrine 
in favor of the Marshall Plan. It has replaced isolationism 
by world-citizenship. From being the young and immature 
relative of some powerful and respected European nation, 
it has become the richest and strongest member of a family 
upon whom the burden of supporting some of the old and 
decrepit members has fallen. --------------------------------------------------
"The United States is not only confronted with the hercul­
ean task of revivifying and re-animating Europe, but she 
also is faced with the problem of trying to establish a new 
balance of power not only in Europe but throughout the 
entire world. It is a task not made easier by the fact that 
the United States is relatively unfamiliar with European 
problems, and is relatively unseasoned in diplomacy. 
"Which of the many changes, upheavals, reversals, crea-
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tions, and annihilations will be called the outstanding 
characteristic of our era by future historians and genera­
tions? What label will be attached to the half-century 
which is about to come to an end? Only time can provide 
the answer. 
"However, it seems to us that the real characteristic of this 
century has been psychological rather than material. It 
started with uncertainty which grew rapidly into fear­
a half-century where fear has mercilessly spread its dread­
ed infection.to every country, community, family, and in­
dividual. Close on the heels of the invading fear came 
hate. Both Hitler and the thirteen men in the Kremlin 
have found that hate is vital to their very existence. 
"What are our fears? Fear of war or of impending war, 
fear of starvation, fear of unemployment, fear of financial 
disaster, and-worst of all-fear of our countrymen. At 
the beginning of the century Theodore Roosevelt admon­
ished his countrymen: "Fear God and take your own part." 
Indeed the majority of Americans, and free people all over 
the world, feared God and nothing else. On the eve of 1950 
we fear so much that unfortunately God has been pushed 
into the background. 
"This fear did not just come, however. On the contrary 
it was cleverly propagated by clever men. Internationally, 
the Nazis and above all the Soviets have scientifically and 
propagandistically tried, not entirely unsuccessfully, to ex­
ploit the fear. Internally the same evil forces are at their 
destructive work. The Communists try to make us fear 
the coming class war and the disruption of our society ....... . 
"On the other hand the American Fascists at the other 
extreme are, in our opinion, no less dangerous. They try 
to teach us a perverted and exaggerated sense of nation­
alism which they place under the appealing guise of 
. 'Americanism'. They try to create fear and hatred of 
those who do not agree with their reactionary ideas and 
methods ...................................................................................... . 
3 
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"Thus, while the last five decades have increased our in­
fluence abroad, they have also made for us many political 
and spiritual enemies. ··························-----------·--·-·--··----·-------·--
"Fear's mortal enemy is faith. The two cannot co-ex­
ist. Therefore to win we must maintain an unshakable 
faith in ourselves and in our society. The merely negative 
statements of belief of the last decade are not nearly 
enough. We must state our beliefs and follow them with 
vigor and almost fanaticism. ---------------------·------·-------··-·---·-··---
"The forces of fear, hatred, persecution, and destruc­
tion have united with the aggressive passion and per­
suasion of the first half of the century. Let the opposed 
forces of freedom, tolerance, and fearlessness, be united 
with the same determination, passion and faith in the 
second half of the century. It is to be our task, and we 
are ready for it, to give later historians the opportunity, 
after such an awful start to call the whole of the twentieth 
century: THE AGE OF FREEDOM!" 
In this editorial our young school boys give three essentials 
-freedom, tolerance, and -fearlessness. They have stressed what
I believe is important, namely that freedom is a positive concept
and should not be considered in the negative way in which lately
it has been expressed. It is not freedom from fear and want, but
rather freedom to act and live as we desire. By the same token,
tolerance should not be considered merely as a negative virtue.
Tolerance should not mean such a lack of caring and believing that
anything goes. Likewise, fearlessness, that special virtue of the
military, can only be a virtue if it includes the conquering through
knowledge. If fearlessness is achieved through blindness and ig­
norance then it degenerates into foolhardiness.
It would seem that the dilemma of our time can best be 
pointed up by the dilemma in which the concept of liberty now 
finds itself. The 19th century man believed in certain tenets which 
4 
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included freedom, tolerance, and fear
lessness, tenets which not 
properly understood have left the· 20th century man hamstrung by 
his own idealism. This does not mean that I do not trust the 
basic concepts. Certainly, academic freedom, for instance, must 
be preserved and yet, as we find ourselves attacked by those who 
use unscrupously our own modes of thought, how far, I wonder; can 
we allow ourselves the luxury of being harassed for the sake of 
not being unfair to the subversive? 
In thinking of America's current position it is not long be­
fore we come to a realization that the position of world power and 
leadership which is America's today is based upon those human 
qualities which are conveniently grouped under the heading Morale. 
Nations are in essence men and what men think and what they are 
is what the nation becomes. 
I sometimes remember the difference between 1916 and 1942. 
In the first case young men marched off to war with an enthusiasm 
and an elan which was based upon their belief-then vivid and 
real-that never again would this bloody business be repeated. 
They came back firm in the belief that wars actually would be no 
more. We may now call it foolish. It certainly has been proved 
unfounded. But at the time that idealism seemed valid indeed. 
Perhaps the greater sense of realism in the early 1940's was a 
healthy thing. Yet the cynicism which prevailed during the second 
· world war, and certainly in the four years which have elapsed
since its conclusion, has left us with fears and doubts, and wars
. and rumors of wars. I have always marveled at the magnificent 
job which the Army, the Navy, and the Marines succeeded in doing 
in inspiring. this great body of young Americans with the spirit 
and the morale which was necessary to win. It shows that a 
proper understanding of the problems of military personnel, com­
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So, gentlemen, I come to state as my first requisite for 
world leadership-Morale. Whether in peace, so-called, or in war 
it is this human factor which is all important. In the concept 
of morale I should like to mention three components. 
First, and by far the least important, I call well-being. 
Certainly the economic and material side of the picture is of great 
importance and I need not spend time in talking too much about 
these things. We all know our great economic strength, and yet 
I submit that this aspect of the case is far less important than 
some others. Certainly under bombardment and alarms, and hav­
ing the very opposite of well-being, Great Britain showed the stuff 
of which her citizens were made, and so did Germany and Japan. 
Secondly, I name leadership. Leadership is a function which 
you gentlemen have been called to exercise professionally all your 
lives. It would be an act of supererogation for me to tell you much 
about personal leadership, but in a discussion of the nation's morale 
there comes in not only the military but also civilian leadership. 
In civilian leadership I wish to include not only political leadership 
but also the kind of day to day standing-in-a-community which is 
represented by the doctor, the clergyman, the school superintendent 
for instance, as well as the harassed business man who gives his 
time to head some civic drive. All of these have their important 
place, yet on the political scene can sometimes assume too great 
importance as, we know so well, happened in countless other 
countries all through history. 
Third, of all the prerequisites for national morale by far the 
most important is a basis of common belief. I fear that this comes 
close to Education for Education today in the minds of many Amer­
icans has taken the place once held by Religion. Perhaps that is 
another way of saying that Education was always part of religion 
-or putting it another way around, that Education is Religion with 
6 
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God left out. Whatever it is, Education is the modern way of weld­
ing America together. I am greatly disturbed by the tendency in 
this country to abandon the Liberal Arts in American education. 
The natural sciences, important, perhaps essential, as they are, 
nevertheless contain within themselves a contradiction in terms, 
for the basis of scientific education is the training in how not to 
believe. Scientific education is synonymous with the education of 
scepticism. Alas, what is needed today is the belief held by all of 
what the material things of this world shall be used for. What 
good is it simply to know the means if the ends are ignored or mis­
understood? It, therefore, seems to me tremendously important 
... that the roots of our civilization be thoroughly understood; that 
we realize the streams with headwaters in Greece, in Rome, and in 
the Hebrew world, which flow together to form our own Christian 
civilization. For without these understandings and without know­
ing the wellsprings of Man's greatest geniuses, how can we find our 
common words anything but trite and hollow epithets. That is one 
of the reasons why so many of us shudder when we hear over the 
radio words like Democracy, Way-of-Life, even the sacred word 
Freedom itself. We know that the people who utter these shib­
boleths have no understanding of their overtones. 
I have called Morale the requisite for national world leader­
ship. But there is a second factor very closely akin yet separable, 
which I shall call, simply, Belief. We are now moving from the 
lesser to the greater, for one can have Morale without Belief but 
not Belief without its attendant result Morale. I am not now think-
. ing purely in t�rms of religious belief, important as that is. I am 
thinking of the national requirement for belief in America's 
mission. Does it seem very old fashioned to speak once more of 
our mission? Yet I believe that there is only one reading of his­
tory. To use a phrase of the end of the last century-I call it, 
"America's Manifest Destiny". It is ours, whether we like it or not 
-this fearsome thing called Power. Our problem is how to use
7 
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it. Certainly one of our fundamental requiremehts is to under­
stand it and thus believe in it. 
We Americans are a curious mixture of shyness and bombast. 
Perhaps the psychologists would tell you that our boasting -comes 
from our basic feeling of insecurity-I don't know. But I do know 
this, that we are not only the most powerful nation on the face of 
the globe today, but that there is no reason why we should not stay 
so for a long time to come ; that the vistas of opportunity and ad-
venture which lie before us are immeasurable; and that all we need 
is a little courage, a little steadiness, and above all a belief in the 
rightness of our cause. I believe in the inevitablity of our triumph, , 
not of the collapse of Capitalism, as is so loudly shouted at us to­
day. I believe in this self-adjusting mechanism we own and op­
erate, a political and economic mechanism which already has proved 
incomparably better than any tyranny that has ever existed. Do 
these things sound like political clap-trap? I submit I am merely 
stating facts. 
· Sometimes, when I get discouraged by the silliness of the
American scene, I am helped by an historical analogy. I know how 
dangerous historical analogies are. They really _ are unsound and 
yet they are fun and, if not taken too seriously, sometimes lead to a 
new understanding. So with your permission I should like to call 
to your attention the parallel between our present state and Ancient 
Rome. 
Let me hasten to say that I am not trying to prove that we 
are at a point analogous to the breakup of the Roman Empire. I 
admit the barbarian tribes do seem rather close sometimes. No, 
we have a long way to go before a modern Alaric sacks our modern 
Rome. By 410 A. D. Rome had been master of the civilized world 
for over half a thousand years. She had reached the apogee, had 
RESTRICTED 
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ered a process of fission, and eventually had succumbed. We
not nearly at that stage. I say this first because we are still
too young, second, we are still expanding, and in my opinion 
l oontinue to do so.
It is not any one historic event to which I wish to draw 
logy but rather to a certain similarity between the modern 
merican scene and certain characteristics not so often explained 
.·.·bl· the schoolboy textbooks but nevertheless obviously present in 
greater or less degree through the long stretch of Roman history. 
First off, let us look at the fact that Ancient Rome was 
founded by a conglomeration of refugees of different races much as 
our own country was. This process of bringing together men of dif­
ferent nationalities continued throughout her long history. While 
at first a certain stamp, or homogeneous attitude, existed, as Rome 
· increased in world importance there flowed to her men of every
nation, particularly men from the older civilization to the East. Thus
we see a truly cosmopolitan civilization based upon the bringing
together and merging of numerous ethnic and cultural strains.
One example of this is the large number of Jews in Rome at the
beginning of the so-called Roman Empire. Indeed the presence
of Orientals is known about from the description of their religious
beliefs and practices. I think particularly of the chapel dedicated
to the Mithraic rite which is found under the Christian church of
· San Clemente.
I should also like to point out that in the Empire period men 
from the provinces rose to great prominence. Many of the most 
famous Emperors-such as Trajan (53-117) Spain; Antoninus Pius 
(86-161) family came from Nimes, France; Diocletian (245-313) 
in Dalmatia-did not come even from Italy. 
Thus it can be seen that Rome derived her power from the 
13
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amalgamation of different strains and the welding together by 
means of a melting-pot-process of many races and cultures. 
Perhaps of all the similarities between our own American 
scene and Ancient Rome the genius for material as against spiritual 
things is the most obvious. The Ancient Romans were never 
creators of things of the spirit, either in art or in literature, as had 
been the Greeks; but for this lack they made up by giving the 
world the finest engineering civilization that existed until the mod­
ern age. Their great roads, amphitheaters, and aqueducts are still 
scattered over the face of Europe from the walls of Hadrian in Scot­
land to the deserts of Africa and on into the East. We still find 
these remains of Ancient Roman glory and power exemplifying the 
greatest tradition of building in the large which the world was to
see for many a long century. 
Furthermore, the Roman age is characterized by emphasis 
on rapid communication. The courier system based on the excel­
lent military roads spanned the civilized world and made possible a 
centralized administration to control the vast Empire under its 
command. While of course the telephone and the radio were not 
available, the Classical equivalent never approached by any other 
people was the fast mail service developed by the centralized sys­
tem of Government which emanated from the Eternal City itself. 
The study of the territorial expansion of the Roman state 
leads me to point out that, first, it is based upon the use of a Navy 
and, second, it was not always agreeable to the inhabitants of 
Rome itself. What I mean is that the invention of a more sea­
worthy and faster naval vessel which could actually grapple with 
the enemy made it possible for Rome to control the Mediterranean 
and so on through the first half of her history we see the essential 
role which sea power played in her expansion. But this expansion, 
as I indicated, was not always looked upon by certain conservative 
10 
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segments of the population as desirable any more than we today,
8
u of us, agree with some of the entangling alliances this country
seems engaged in making. In other words, there was an isolation­
ist party in Ancient Rome as well as in America; but the logic of
events forced Rome to her Imperial destiny just as I believe we to­
day are forced into taking an ever stronger position as world lead­
er. The necessity of maintaining oontrol over the grain shipments 
from Egypt and from what was then the fertile North African 
coast, the threat to her commerce by means of the inroads of busi­
ness from the East and the North, the importance of maintaining 
what she already had by increasing her boundaries, seem to me 
analagous in so many ways to our situation today. Inevitably, as 
nations increase in power they find it necessary to expand further, 
not for the sake of expansion itself but in order to protect what 
they have. This process can be seen today in the actions of the 
Soviet Union which has attempted to throw around its own heart­
land a zone of puppet states. Certainly Okinawa today is in our 
hands because we already possessed Hawaii, just as Hawaii was 
originally acquired because we controlled the Pacific Coast. Now 
comes the problem of Formosa and its relation to the Philippines. 
And so on will the problems extend just as ripples flowing from a 
stone thrown in a millpond. 
The Roman people originally set up a city state, a remark­
ably coherent system of government which worked for two or three 
hundred years with marked success but, like all governments basic­
ally designed for relatively small operations, it broke down under 
the stress of world responsibility. The period which interests me 
most in the long history of Rome is the last century B. C., when 
through a series of events, each associated with an individual name, 
deep rifts were caused in the basic structure of the Republic. Take 
for instance the armed uprising led by Marius, the people's champ­
ion, and then by his rival Sulla, who represented the conservative 
11 15
Naval War College: February 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
element. These so weakened the structure of Government that it 
bowed beneath the weight of its world responsibilities and became 
prey to the dictatorial genius of Julius Caesar. Yet the interesting 
thing to me is that after Caesar was murdered, his young nephew 
Octavius, his self-styled heir and eventual master of the world, pro­
ceeded to revive the ancient Republic. He refused any Eastern 
title such as King, insisted upon the elections as in the past, but 
saw to it that he kept the power inherent in the Tribuneship of the 
people. If you had been living in Rome at that time, Octavius would 
not have seemed to have the attributes that history books associate 
with the world Emperor. Indeed this was merely a military title 
somewhat similar to Field Marshall or General of the Army. Octa­
vius strove to revive and reconstitute the Republican constitution 
which had been put aside during the Civil Wars and yet, as so often 
in history, restorations become new entities themselves. The posi­
tion of First Citizen-or Princeps-assumed by Octavius and passed 
on to the long series of men we call Roman Emperors, ceased to sig­
nify what was originally intended and became in fact the central 
autocratic power which we now associate with the Roman Empire. 
At the same time the inadequate and overburdened Republic civil 
administration was greatly expanded and there developed the in­
evitable Governmental bureaucracy which seems always to be pres­
ent with the consolidation of great civil power. 
On the educational and cultural side, I should like to point 
out that Rome conquered Greece and removed forever any further 
threat from Macedon and, in conquering Greece, she brought to 
Rome Greek teachers, Greek drama and literature, and the treasures 
of Greek art. Roman youth was sent to finishing school in Athens 
and in Rhodes. Greek teachers were brought into the households of 
patrician families to be tutors to their children. This is a situation 
very similar to the American conquest of Europe from where, over 
the last years, we have ourselves brought to this country large 
12 
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quantities of European art and have found great satisfaction in 
sending Rhodes scholars to Oxford and other young men to study 
on the Continent. Yet we find it very difficult in this country to 
develop any original artistic style of our own.. Our painters de­
rive from the School of Paris and even in the realm of the movies 
the great technical supremacy of Hollywood rarely equals the artis­
tic excellence of many films made in Europe. 
Furthermore, the Romans were a fickle people. Their ath­
letic heroes were exalted one year and cast down the next. They 
rejoiced in great spectacles like our Middle Western football games 
or even our World Series. Roman youths cared more about taking 
their exercise vicariously as some of us do. Others competed in 
the Ancient Grecian games, but in Greece, as witness the Emperor 
Nero, who at sixty-six, made a tour of Greece and was successfully 
and successively acclaimed at all the games which he had arranged 
to have held all in the same year. 
Lastly, I want to speak of what I consider to be the most 
important subject for us to study, namely the gradual increase in 
franchise granted over the years by Rome itslf. It was largely on 
this basis that she managed to maintain so long her hold on so 
varied a population. The vast so-called Provinces like North Africa, 
Spain, Gaul, and the Provinces in the East were ruled by former 
consuls who were rewarded for political success at home by being 
given a position of complete dictatorial power over these pro-consular 
provinces. This was a very lucrative post as the pro-consuls were 
able to extort enormous sums of money from the people under their 
eway. The tax gathering system by which taxes were farmed out to 
companies who paid an agreed upon sum and then proceeded to col­
lect as much as they possibly could, led to a great, if nefarious busi­
ness. Yet it was the bringing of men of military experience, who 
of ten became the governors and rulers of these provinces, as ad-
13 
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ministrators back to the central capital which eventually amal­
gamated the different parts of the Empire and brought into a closer 
harmony the different kinds of administrations. It could be said 
perhaps that the Empire was the conquering of the City of Rome 
and its basically Republican constitution by the more autocratic type 
of Government which had existed in the provinces. Yet we must 
never forget that the vestigial remains of the Republican system 
of Government continued in the presence of the Senate in Rome to 
the end of the Empire. 
Now you may ask why do I mention these matters which 
seem to have little or no relation to the current American scene. It 
is only because I believe our particular destiny�call it Imperial if 
you will, although this word must be defined quite differently in 
our time-is already forcing us to place people in positions of res'." 
ponsibility in foreign countries much as did Rome so many cen­
turies ago-our General Clays and MacArthurs for instance are not 
too dissimilar to Roman pro-consuls. I am not trying to say that 
we can draw a close analogy from the past or that by analogy we 
can predict with any degree of accuracy things to come. I do sub. 
mit, however, that the same causes bring similar results and that, 
while no two causes are ever exactly alike, I do think that over the 
years the destiny of America will be toward a world hegemony, not 
like the Roman but having nevertheless many points of similarity. 
Many of our troubles today in this country come because our Re­
publican Government, quite adequate at first to the town meeting in 
New England and then made to function as an adequate govern­
ment for a continental nation, is finding difficulty in adjusting it­
self to the demands of world leadership. The Isolationists in this 
country were correct when they looked with grave mistrust at 
America's ability to do anything about the outside world. Yet events 
have overleapt our own desire and against our will we are forced in­
to the difficult position of power and, therefore, of responsibility for 
14 
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which as yet we are not entirely fitted. But I look forward with the
sure conviction of ultimate success because I believe that, if there
is one characteristic of the American people, it is our adaptability.
We come from so many races and have a system of government 
so flexible and so easily managed that we have proved in the past,
as we know we shall in the future, our ability to develop a leader­
ship where it is needed and which will be adequate to the strains and 
stresses of world responsibility. All we need is to believe in our 
destiny and we shall find the way. 
Lastly, I want to point out that it was the gradual increase 
by Rome of the franchise, the right of citizenship, to other people 
-'first to the surrounding natives of the Italian Peninsular and then 
to the provinces as they became more closely akin in civilization to 
Rome itself, that she developed her rule of Law. We remember 
that St. Paul, a Jew, living 2,000 miles from Rome, claimed his 
Roman citizenship and thus his right to be tried under what was 
certainly the most nearly fair administration of justice so far de­
vised. I believe that we in this country must develop increased in­
terest in Law and in the propagation of our Anglo-Saxon code of 
justice and that by some method of world association yet to be de­
vised we must form a government, not so much supranational in the 
sense that the World Federalists speak of, but rather by means of a 
system of international citizenship under our own system which 
can have a two-fold advantage-first a single system of justice and 
the economic advantage which comes therefrom and, second, the 
calling forth of responsibility which is inherent in all citizenship, 
because citizenship is fundamentally two-way. The privilege of citi­
zenship is to serve as well as to derive the benefits of protection 
from the central authority. But, gentlemen, these matters are in 
the womb of our destiny-they are to be worked for continually but 
not to be expected immediately. The day to day events are trivial 
compared to the long swing of history and thus as the Pax Romana 
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brought peace and prosperity to the conglomerate peoples of the 
ancient world, so I believe, with proper faith, with the belief in the 
rightness and justice of our cause, with the infusion through our 
own body politic of the tradition which has already made us great, 
we can look forward to a long era of American leadership and the 
Pax Americana. But the Pax Americana, this world leadership of 
ours, is not to be thought of as something imperial in the old sense. 
Imperialism and Colonialism, as practiced in the old days are gone 
forever. Dr. Vannevar Bush in the beginning of his new book 
Modern Arms and Free Men points it up when he says: 
"It is highly important that the general outlook of the 
people be sound as we face the future. If we had been in 
abject terror, facing a new inevitable war that would des­
troy our cities, our farms, and our way of life, we would 
have followed some Pied Piper in the last election who 
would have led us into the sea. This we emphatically did 
not do. In spite of alarms, in spite of the prophets 
of doom, we face the future with resolution. If, as a 
people we had felt all-powerful, that we could speak and 
the world would tremble, that we had a mission to rule 
the unenlightend, that we were a super-race, we would 
have followed a demagogue. There was not even a single 
demagogue of the sort in sight on the national horizon. 
The steadiness of purpose of the American people is our 
hope and refuge." 
This steadiness of purpose is the essence of Morale. On 
national morale depends the existence of this country. With the 
prospect of our glorious future and armed with the knowledge of 
what can be done and also what cannot, we may confidently look 
forward to the epithet our schoolboys have suggested for their age 
-THE AGE OF FREEDOM.
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A lecture delivered by 
Dr. John Fairbank 
at the Naval War College 
October 31, 1949 
I have been a student of one of your earlier speakers, Dr. 
T. F. Tsiang, the present Chinese delegate to the United Nations. I 
have also been a subordinate in the Embassy in China under Mr. W. 
W. Butterworth of the State Department, another of your earlier
speakers. Consequently, I feel very fortunate that I appear here
after them. I speak as an historian w_ho has been associated with
social scientists. I have had about twenty years practice in trying
to deal with the Chinese scene in fifty-three minutes. This today,
will be briefer and so I will make it a bit condensed.
I am concerned with the historical and social science ap­
proach to China and our China problems. And I want to do three 
things: first, characterize the old Ch_inese society ; second, charac­
terize the process of revolution which is now turning that society in­
side out; and third, comment, from that point of view, on American 
relations with China, past, present and future. 
My main idea is that China is a different and unique social 
system or organization or society, a group of people living in a 
peculiar way of their own, and will continue to be so. And of 
course, I assume that the United States is also a unique social sys­
tem which will continue more or less in its own pattern. Neither 
Dr. John Fairbank is Professor of History, and Associate Chair­
man of the Committee on International and Regional Studies in 
charge of the China Area Program at Harvard University. He is the 
author of the book entitled, "The United States and China," which was 
published in 1948. 
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we nor they will change very greatly in our system of values, and 
the general trends of our development. 
My second idea is that China is in a state of revolution, by 
which I mean gradual social change, not just disorder, but change 
in the structure of the society, how it is put together, how the in­
dividuals fit into it, what they expect, how they motivate them­
selves in their daily lives
'. 
. And, of course, I have to note that the 
· United States is in a process of change too. You may not call it
revolution but still it is a rapid social change in this country with
which we are more or less accustomed; we are developing. · So
these two societies are both moving along in streams of develop­
ment.
Now a third idea that I would put forward is that China is 
obviously .a factor in American security. It is desirable to keep 
China from being our enemy, but that approach to China, purely as 
a security problem, is not, it seems to me, the whole story. China 
has to be understood for itself, as it is. In other words, we have to 
maintain a high degree of objectivity. What is good for the Chinese 
people, comparatively speaking? What will they take? What will 
they do? It will be ineffective if we try to use China. I think our 
frame of reference should be that we are trying to work with 
.Chinese social forces, tQ influence the process of change in China, 
not merly to use it. I think we have fallen into trouble through the 
effort to use the situation without enough consideration about how 
the Chinese felt about it themselves. 
I have divided this presentation into two parts: first, the 
continuity of Chinese conditions and institutions; and second, the 
continuity of United States interest and policy. My effort is to es­
tablish the continuity or trend in China, and in this country in our 
relations to China, so as to make a projection toward the future-­
to foresee what our relations may be in days to come. 
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I begin, therefore, with the continuity of Chinese conditions 
and institutions ; and, as I said, I will take the first topic, the 
characteristics of the old traditional way of life; then come later to 
the question of revolution. Now this traditional way of life, I 
think, we have to take up under the four headings: economics, poli­
tics, sociology, ideology; these things that we use in our universities 
to make what analysis we can of how a society functions, what holds 
it together. I will go rapidly over these major topics which you 
are, to a considerable extent, well acquainted with. 
First of all, take the Chinese economy in the old traditional 
way of life. It was a rice economy, or at least an economy of in­
tensive agriculture, in South China, for example. Now this in­
tensive agriculture where you plant each blade of rice by hand, 
called for a very heavy application of manpower to a small amount 
of land and irrigation of that land with a heavy application of 
water. This technique gets maximum land use, intensively, through 
the heavy use of manpower. Manpower is cheap and you use lots of 
it, lots of people. By doing that, in this economy, you can main­
tain a self-sustaining mechanism-a lot of people living at a low 
level but feeding themselves by intensive agriculture, putting their 
manpower into small plots of land. Well, that results in a dense 
population and a crowded countryside. As you know, if you fly 
over China, you pass one plot of trees after another with fields in 
between. The trees are where farmhouses would be in Illinois or 
Iowa, but each of those clumps of trees is a village of two or three 
hundred people. Where it would be an American farm family, you 
have hundreds of people living on the land, using these half-acre 
plots apiece, and so that means a low standard of living. And the 
result of this economic situation over the centuries has been a low 
evaluation of the individual and a high evaluation of social order. 
The individual is cheap, there are lots of individuals, coolie labor 
is a glut; you can dispense with it, use it, throw it away. But because 
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there are lots of people and these people have to live together, 
there is a high evaluation put on maintaining social order, training 
persons to be orderly, to maintain their status, to be polite,-all 
these various things that you expect of Chinese. They live in a 
crowded situation that we are not acquainted with. 
Now turn to the sociology of this old society. Social struc­
ture is centered on the family as a unit, not on the individual. The 
whole system is reflected in the custom of arranged marriage, just to 
take one example. If you grew up in a Chinese family in the old style, 
your marriage is arranged · for you-you never see, before your 
marriage, the person you marry. The marriage is arranged between 
families, between your family and another; you are merely the tool 
of your family; you are used to create a marriage to carry on the 
family. That all ties in with ancestor worship and all these various 
things, as you know. This practice, of course, in the old family 
systems means a low evaluation of youth, as compared to age. The 
elders are the venerable respected people; they are closest to the an­
cestors who were also venerated. It also means a low evaluation of 
woman and a male domination; the woman goes out of her house­
hold into that of her husband. The husband stays in his hou�e­
hold. As the younger son, he gets married in the big courtyard of 
another house. Ideally, the daughter-in-law comes in; she is the 
stranger, the slave who works her way up in the new family. 
Now with that social system based on the family, there is 
another very striking characteristic of the old Chinese society­
that it is a bifurcated class structure. Well, that is a fancy name 
for the idea that there was a ruling stratum and a mass of peasantry 
below, say 80% of peasants living on the land in their farms and 
villages and above them a ruling stratum into which they might 
move, of course. There was nobility; you could rise if you were 
good, but on the whole people didn't too much. 
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This ruling stratum was, you might say, a triangular arrange­
ment of three dominant groups. It is a very interesting thing to 
study because it had tremendous stability and is dying so hard to­
day. On the three different sides you had three different kinds of 
people. They all played ball together and were tied in with the 
families. On one side you had the landlord families, people who 
got a little surplus off the land. And maybe they weren't just 
grasping landlords; they would even till their own land, but still 
they got some surplus by renting out their land. So they had a 
little leisure; they didn't have to work all the time, at least their 
sons didn't have to work all the time. 
So the landlord class produced a second side of this tri­
angle, the scholar class. You had to have time as a boy to learn 
Chinese-it takes you a long time to do it at anytime. The land­
lord class produced scholars by studying the classics. And these 
scholars, in turn, produced the third side of this triangle, the of­
ficials, because from the scholars, as you know, the officials were se­
lected by the examination system. The triangle was complete when 
the official used his position to buy more land, and he could do it. The 
official was at the top in this society and thus maintained his land­
lord and landowner position. In this way the upper stratum main­
tained its ideology, its social organization, its values, its way of 
life with great stability over, as you know, 2,000 years, back to the 
unification of the Empire in 221 B. C. or another thousand years 
behind that through the period of Confucius and beyond. 
Now that meant that the peasant was out of government. 
The peasant did not participate in the activities of this ruling strat­
um and did not decide how much he would be taxed or anything 
of that kind. The affairs of state were the concern of the of­
ficial landlord-scholar type, the top class. On the other hand, 
you have to recognize that this old Chinese social structure left the 
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government rather superficial. The peasant in his family units, in 
his villages, took care of himself, more or less; he just paid his 
taxes and the government was the rather thin upper crust over the 
surface of this vast mass of millions and millions of peasants. 
Now suppose we turn to the political structure of this old 
China. China was a unit secluded geographically from any com­
parable unit, so it was the universe, the Emperor, the Son of 
Heaven who ruled everything. Barbarians were round-about it, but 
there were no equals. The official class I have spoken of com­
prised a bureaucratic government which ran the Empire on be­
half of the Emperor using his prerogatives. 
Then there developed in the course of Chinese history an­
other very interesting political feature, namely that barbarians 
began to come into China and conquer the place periodically-a 
very interesting phenomenon and very important I think. The 
reason this was possible was that on the steppe in Inner-Mongolia 
where these barbarians lived as pastoral nomads, they developed a 
striking power, militarily, through the mounted archer, which the 
settled Chinese farmers couldn't withstand. One million, or maybe 
two million at most, of these steppe nomads, out on the desert, 
where it was too dry to cultivate anything with their type of cul­
ture, could send an army like that of the Mongols, or later the 
Manchus, into China and knife through any number of peasantry 
and conquer the country. A very amazing phenomenon that four 
hundred million, or maybe two hundred and fifty million in the 
old days of China, could be taken over by one or two million of 
these barbarian invaders. How did it happen? It happened several 
times in succession; the Chinese would make a comeback and then 
the barbarians would sweep in again a couple of hundred years 
later and stay for one hundred or two hundred years. The Chinese 
would throw them out, and they would come back in-a real se­
quence of this thing. 
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So the Chinese dealing with the barbarian is part of Chinese 
history; it is part of Chinese society. It is an important factor of 
their political life-this constant question of how you deal with 
the strong, but uncultivated, barbarian menace. Of course, one 
thing to do is to play him off against other barbarians. When the 
Chinese were strong enough they did that. For century after cen­
tury they would deal with one group of Mongols and then deal 
with another group; they would back one against another in their 
tribal wars out in the desert on the steppe, and in that way would 
keep them neutralized, keep them harmless. But from time to 
time the steppe would become unified and then they'd.come in. The 
Mongols came in and ruled China for more than a century. The 
Manchus came in two centuries later, and they ruled China for two 
hundred and seventy-six years, a very long time. They did it, of 
course, by a combination of diarchy in administration; that is, 
rule by both groups, using Chinese as officials, as well as Manchus. 
And combined with that there was what you might call cultural 
symbiosis; that's a fancy word, but I think it is useful to express 
the idea that the two cultures were maintained separately, side 
by side. The Manchus kept their own culture, their own way of 
life, their distinct entity as Manchus; they didn't inter-marry, they 
didn't let the Manchus work. They kept them on stipends as 
warriors in garrisons, kept them separate, and only by keeping 
this small group of Manchus separate were they able to maintain 
that power so long. 
Now that resulted in a very interesting political tradition 
in China; namely, that the dynasty and the bureaucracy, the Em­
peror and his family and all the officials, stood together against 
the mass of people because they were the ruling group. The mass 
of the people were the people from whom you got the wherewithal 
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to maintain yourself; you took it out in taxes. The dynasty might 
be an alien dynasty, but the bureaucracy still would stick with it. 
That was a peculiar situation. The secret of that, I think, lies in 
this element of ideology. 
I'll move on to ideology, the ideology of Confucianism­
one of the neatest, most comprehensive, and most stable sets of 
ideas ever evolved for the establishment and maintenance of social 
order. The individual fitted into a status in society and was trained 
to know how he should behave at all times. Not the kind of 
training you know about here, because you train people within 
the framework of naval service, or military service, to know how 
to behave at all times in connection with your profession alone. 
Well, Confucianism is that sort of system in all aspects of life­
how the husband should behave toward his wife; how the same 
man as son should behave toward his father, or his mother-in-law, 
or his child; or how this man, as a subject, should behave toward 
his ruler. All this was worked out in minute detail and indoctrinated 
in the Chinese mind along with the learning of the language. You 
began to study Chinese by studying the Chinese language in the 
Classics. The Classics begin by giving you this ideology immed­
iately, so that you can't grow up, you can't become literate, with­
out absorbing this whole system of status, relationships, how you 
should behave-Confucianism, in short. As your mind develops, 
it is cast in that mold. 
The idea is still very strong in Chinese life that education 
is indoctrination in order to maintain the stability of social insti­
tutions including the political power of those who are ruling. Now, 
Confucianism was not one of these authoritorian despotisms. The 
Emperor was all powerful, but he had to act according to the 
rules of the game, just as any subject should act. According to 
the Confucian rules, the ruler was supposed to do the right thing 
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at the right time in an almost ritual manner. If he did the right 
thing he got tremendous prestige, and this prestige was believed 
to have a certain influence. His good conduct gave him power 
over the people. They would admit, when they saw his example, 
that he was a good man and should rule, and so moral prestige be­
came essential to the conduct of government. This rather super­
ficial, not very powerful, government ruled the mass of the peas­
antry by morale prestige, doing the right thing, therefore having 
the virtue which gave it the right to rule. That idea is still very 
strong. 
Now the revolutionary process hit this old society. Let me 
take that up as my second main consideration. The revolutionary 
process, which began in modern China in the last century, is gain­
ing momentum; things are happening faster and faster today. 
Let's look at it· economically, ideologically, socially, politically. 
To begin economically ,-of course, foreign trade came in and it 
produced an agrarian crisis, as it has in most countries. The 
farmer who had been producing his own cotton goods on his own 
little farm now began .. to find that Manchester and Lancashire 
cotton and later Japanese cotton goods or Indian cotton goods 
were splitting the China market. Finally, the factories came into 
China itself, in Shanghai, Japanese or British factories and some 
Chinese. When the farmer became dependent on the money econ­
omy, this new cotton goods knocked out the handicraft industry 
that had produced cotton for the farmer in the old days. Cities 
began to grow up and industrialization came in, and that led, of 
course, to a population increase, or a tendency toward population in­
crease, pressing. on subsistence. You know that kind of economic 
situation; it produces extreme poverty; we know and can under­
stand it; you just translate the material terms for yourself and 
you've got the economic picture. The thing we neglect, I think, 
is the sociological and ideological side that goes with it. 
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Well what happens sociologically? The family was pretty 
hard hit. Why? Because in the old days the family was a self­
contained unit; you functioned in it, working for it, living from it, 
without any personality problem or wage problem or ownership 
of property. Everything was in common in the family; you worked 
in the field, you ate at the table, your father died, you succeeded 
him, no money changed hands. Now in the new China, industriali­
zation comes in. If you are in the city, or even in the country, 
you do something for wages; money payments come in. If you 
are a working individual, you get paid a wage; you are independ­
ent of your family, independent of this little microcosm you form­
erly would have lived in. And so the family doesn't have quite 
its old cohesion. The mother-in-law can't control the daughter-in­
law, when the daughter-in-law makes her own wages. The husband 
can't control the wife, when the wife is working somewhere in the 
city-his old control breaks down. Then freedom of marriage comes 
along. That is just another symptom, in contrast to the old ar­
ranged marriage, and so you get a youth movement. The young 
people begin to break away from the old family system. They 
say, "Age should not receive the only veneration; we are students 
and scholars; though young, we deserve a chance to live our own 
lives." The young students also use this old prerogative of the 
scholar being top dog. It used to be the old man who had time to 
learn everything in the classics, but now the scholar is the young 
student, still the scholar, but young. 
At the same time you break down the family, you break 
down the old landlord system. The old landlord class begins to
become an absentee landlord class. You move to the city, nowa­
days, if you are of this old scholar-gentry on the land. When you 
move to the city you are out of touch with the peasants, you do 
things for them impersonally that you used to do by personal con­
tact, mediating their disputes, helping them in some of their 
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problems. · The good side of the landlord-tenant relationship breaks 
down when you are an· absentee; you just squeeze them for what 
they have to pay you in rent. Thus, peasant disorder more easily 
comes up. There are other reasons for peasant revolutions, but 
peasant revolution comes along. It comes in a Chinese cycle; 
actually, every two or three centuries peasant revolution has come 
in the past, in the course of things. It began about 1850 last time in 
China and is still there to use. Now this results in a great op-. 
portunity, socially speaking; the opportunity to use the new eman­
cipated youth of China for the purpose or organizing the formerly 
inert peasantry of China, and that is the combination the Commun­
ists have got. Before them, of course, the Kuomintang had . it; 
that is the combination that wins, because you organize this enor­
mous manpo:wer through it. 
In politics, let us look at this revolutionary process in China. 
The first thing was a response to the West by imitating the West. 
The West was powerful, therefore you must imitate it; you be­
come nationalistic, you act toward the West in the same way as the 
West acts toward itself or toward you ; you have a consciousness 
of China as a nation among other nations for the first time, instead 
of being the whole empire and universe with nothing but barbarians 
around. And so you knock out the old dynasty, you kick out the 
Manchus who are foreigners after all, and set up a Republic in 
1911. Well, that's the first phase. In response to the West, ChinesP. 
nationalism rose against the Manchus at last, knocking out the 
dynasty. Then the question comes up, how do you set up this new 
Chinese Republic back in 1911 ? You try the democratic process, a 
parliament and cabinet government with a president and all the 
stuff that the British were using. The British was the top, nation 
at that period--even the Americans were using it. So you try 
that; it doesn't work,- Why? Well, China is a different society; 
it is not that kind of society; there is no way in the world of making 
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parliaments work in China at that time. The old situation breaks 
down, Sun Yat-sen fails. The war lords take over and in the old 
Chinese style move in after the dynasty walks out, grabbing a little 
area in each part of China as before. 
What finally happens as the solution of reorganizing the new 
China under the Republic? Well, you know the answer-party 
dictatorship was picked up by Sun Yat-sen. He was anti-Russian, 
on the whole, but was willing to cooperate with anybody. He didn't 
believe in Communism; but he used one of its principles for organ­
izing the new China, namely, the selected group, the party dicta­
torship. The new elite stratum would take over the government 
just as the official class used to, and operate things nominally for 
the good of the peasant in the way the official class used to, carrying 
on the old tradition in a new form. Of course, it is also a new tradi­
tion, but it can't be a Western style parliamentary government. It's 
a party dictatorship that hangs together, following a leader; it has 
these Fascist, European-style or Communist-type overtones. Chiang 
Kai-shek became the leader; he set up his regime with himself at 
the top of the triangle of the party, the army, and the government'. 
These three things he stood on; he was at the top of each. That 
was the system that organized China under the Kuomintang. Now 
it is very interesting to see, of course, that it is really the Soviet 
system, in a certain formal way; it is interesting to see that the 
Communists today carry on very much the same system. You can 
either say they got it from the Russians, or you can say they got 
it from the Kuomintang who got it from the Russians, or you could 
even find some evidence that Sun Yat-sen was working it out for 
himself before he took the Russian example, before the Russian 
revolution. We shouldn't say this is just the Russian influence. 
There is something in the Chinese scene that allows a party to come 
in and take the place of the old dynasty, or the old foreign invader; 
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this selected group that runs things. That appears to be happening 
today. 
Now what happened ideologically in this revolutionary pro­
cess? Of course they began studying the West, the United States 
-students coming here, using liberalism, individualism, the doc­
trines that made the West so strong. But then they found that in
their crowded country they had a low standard of living, with all
their traditions and different social context; liberalism didn't work
out. It was insufficient to maintain and develop the degree of social
order which they wanted. The whole idea of Western individual­
ism seemed rather chaotic and anarchic. And today, when Secre­
tary Acheson puts out his cover letter to the White Paper and re­
fers to the fact that we will continue to hope for the triumph of
the forces of "democratic individualism" in China, it proves to be
a great mistake to say it. "Democratic individualism" is a golden
word to us, I think, but it is a garbage word in China because they
associate with this term individualism-the whole experience they
had of the western invasion breaking up the family, leaving the
average Chinese isolated without all these relationships that he was
accustomed to having, atomized-incapable of doing anything by
himself, so that he had to join a party if he was going to get re­
sults. All that idea is in their minds. So "individualism" is not
the good thing we think it is, where the individual expresses him­
self and his personality. In China, it is a factor for disorder and
difficulty and breakdown; they are against it. "Democratic individ­
ualism" therefore, they immediately translated their way. They
:ran editorials on it for weeks afterward and are still doing it,
using it against us. They don't like it.
The Chinese Communists obviously have combined these in­
gredients in the Chinese scene. They show the most promise of 
anybody in recent decades of setting up a strong political order. 
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They have been using the peasant revolution on the land. Now, 
of course, they have turned the corner; they say they will have to 
industrialize, so henceforth it is a question of how much they can 
get out of the peasant, how far they can squeeze him. TI,iey will 
have peasant trouble from now on. Still they were able to use 
the breakup of the old family, the breakdown of the old landlord­
gentry class, to put their own system in. It is a modification by 
which you are loyal, not to the family so much as to the party. So 
you join up. And where the gentry does not run things locally the 
party does, in this new way of organization. They are committed to 
industrialization and they proclaim themselves intensely national­
istic. That, of course, is a tough question-how far it is possible to 
combine a genuine Chinese nationalism with the Marxist ideology 
sent from Moscow. Of course we immediately say, "How about 
Titoism ?" Mao Tse-tung immediately comes out saying, "The hell 
with Tito!" 
Now that is, I think, a Chinese situation. In other words, 
what Mao Tse-tung says is for political purposes. Personally, I 
don't know whether China is going to be run by the Russians or 
not, aside from the fact that they are all Marxists. 
Well, in this situation there are continuing elements. A poor 
dense population, facing famine in the year ahead because of the 
disastrous floods and famine in North China and on the Yangtse, is 
likely to be governed by a bureaucratic official class, a selected 
elite, in this case organized by the Communist party and likely to be 
strongly pro-Chinese. However, they may work it out with a 
tradition of alien influence and alien rule. 
Now, let us look briefly at the American policy in relation 
to this Chinese scene. Our contact with China began in our seek­
ing access for trade in 1784. And we got a treaty and extra­
territoriality to give us greater access for trade in 1844. This idea 
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of access for trade developed in the "open door", which was as 
much British as American. The open door for trade in 1899 de­
veloped further into the idea for independence and integrity of 
China. So this idea of Chinese integrity and independence is more 
�. than a merely economically motivated idea on our part. Our trade
=· . with China has actually been rather small most of the time. We
ii.· 
have also had extensive missionary and humanitarian interests in 
China. Part of our own democratic faith has found expression in 
hoping that we could help the Chinese to get what we regard as 
benefits from democracy, the American way of life. We have been 
expansive in the 19th and 20th centuries. We have also developed 
a certain sympathy I think for the Chinese personality-there is 
something about the Chinese individual toward which we feel 
rather sympathetic. He is in difficulty, he has a sense of humor, 
he is very civilized, he understands people. We get on with him 
usually, we understand his vices, we admire his virtues. It has 
been this friendliness which is not just an economic imperialistic 
ambition but also a matter of actual sentiment between peoples. 
That is our background of a pretty good record, made pos­
sible, most likely, because the British did the dirty work in the 
19th century. They fought the wars; we came along behind and 
took the opportunities. We didn't get on the spot until recently as 
the representative of the West. The British were the great West­
ern representatives before. They took the rap in 1926 when China 
was feeling anti-foreign. It was anti-British. Now, of course, it 
is anti-American. 
Up against this new situation-this new power with which 
we finished the last war, power on the Chinese scene because of the 
troops and armament that we have there, we preceded to make a 
series of errors. We made some good tries, but we also made 
some errors. And our problem now, it seems to me, is to study 
our post-war record against the background of Chinese conditions 
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and traditions and to chart a new course, not willfully, but with as 
much preception of these long term trends as we can. For that 
purpose the White Paper was put out, aside from the necessity of 
shutting off the Republicans. The White Paper was very bad 
news for us in China. The covering letter by Mr. Acheson played 
the document as though we had always been for Chiang Kai-shek 
when General Marshall was mediating. The Communists have· 
jumped on that; they have said that the White Paper proved that 
General Marshall never was a mediator at all-which is their propa­
ganda lie, doing the paper injustice of course. In general, we have 
wiped our feet on the Nationalist government without, on the other 
hand, ingratiating ourselves with the Communists. Nobody wants 
to ingratiate himself with the Communists; it doesn't work out. But 
either way you take it, we haven't made much progress in China 
with the White Paper. You have to recognize that it probably was 
not a help to put it out. Therefore, we have to capitalize on the 
advantage it gives us in our own thinking at home, because it 
does give us the record. And don't let anyone tell you, like Con­
gressman Judd, that anything is suppressed and ought to be there 
that isn't. It is true the military record is not built up because that 
was not in the State Department's problems. The White Paper 
gives you the story condensed in a thousand pages. It ought to 
be studied, and our great opportunity in having it is that we can 
use it for purposes of study. 
So I proceed now to name what I think are some of the 
errors which you can document from this body of documentation: 
Error number one, American sentimentality or wishfulness and 
hopefulness about China during the war, the big build-up about 
freeing China, the great heroic effort that was going on. But 
actually, it was a pretty tough spot for the poor Chinese to be in, 
and a lot of individual graft went on. People were trying to save 
themselves from inflation. We built up a fine picture and came 
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out with this policy that China must be one of the big five, and we 
must help China to become strong, united, and democratic at the 
end of the war. Therefore, we had a great hope, I think, which was 
unrealistic at the end of the war, to start us off on our activities 
in China. 
Secondly, we showed bad judgment. We didn't look at the 
facts of the local situation when we refused to see that Chiang 
Kai-shek was on the way out, that he was going to lose to the 
Communists sooner or later. His system wasn't getting the basis 
of power in China in the form of a peasantry which it could use 
for taxes and an army. On the other hand, the Communists with 
their syst�m, were getting the basis of power because they could 
use the peasantry to support an army and that would give the game 
to the Communists. We refused to see that. We thought we were 
so powerful we could change that ; we didn't realize how difficult 
it is to get into China. You can get to the coast, you can get to 
the main cities, but you can't get inland. Logistically it is a night­
mare. 
Error number three: I think we were rather naive, because 
we put our faith in material things and, I think we all realize 
upon reflection that no social revolution, no process in the change 
of a society, the way people live together, and what they believe 
in and how they act toward one another, no process of that kind 
is purely a material matter. You may be able to slow it down by 
raising the standard of living and filling the belly, but that doesn't 
solve all problems. And we had a good deal of faith that by ma­
terial means we could turn the course of the Chinese revolution-by 
arms, for instance. It was probably unlucky that we had so many 
arms on the Chinese scene, destined for many Chinese armies we had 
been training against Japan and continued-about half of them­
in the Lend-Lease pipeline after the end of the war, as we did in no 
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other part of the world. We kept feeding in equipment to these 
Chinese troops. As a result, the Chinese Communists today have 
a better-armed army, with American equipment, than the Chinese 
ever had. But they are an anti-American army. The arms moved 
right through the Chiang Kai-shek troops which didn't have the 
morale to keep them. They were much easier to sell. The Chinese 
Nationalists had nothing to fight for which would keep them from 
selling arms when they got in a jam, or surrendering them when 
they were surrounded. And so this whole process went on, which is 
recorded by General Barr and others in the White Paper. For ex­
ample, Chiang Kai-shek's troops, being on the defensive psychologi­
cally, would stay in the cities and on the railroads, as the Japanese 
did. In the cities they had their artillery, but you can't use artillery 
against the countryside. The Communists had no command posts, 
no dumps, nothing you could hit. They were scattered around the 
peasantry. You couldn't use the artillery of the United States to 
defeat the Communists. Eventually, the Communists began to cap­
ture this artillery, they bought up some of it. Then they were in 
clover, because they could use artillery against fortified strong 
points. And, when the Communists began to get some American 
artillery and turn it on the little cities and outposts, Chiang Kai­
shek's troops were finished. 
Error number four was, I think, a wrong emphasis or wrong 
proportion in our aid program to China. We put arms and eco­
nomic aid first. We didn't have any way of dealing with the 
social situation or the sociological changes. What do you do with 
youth? What do you do with emancipated women? The Com­
munists organized them, meanwhile, and we were sitting on the 
sidelines. We didn't do much ideologically. We talked about our 
own ideals, which are excellent, which apply to our country, and 
which we maintain and defend. Yet those ideals do not exactly 
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apply, in our terms, to the Chinese peasant. They must be trans­
lated somehow; and we haven't found out how to do it yet. 
Error number five: We were inexperienced about what could 
be done. For the Chinese economy we thought we could send much 
more aid than we could. We found that a backward, undeveloped 
economy like China could not absorb the economic aid we sent. You 
could get it to the dock; you might get into the warehouse, or across 
the river at Shanghai, at a cost equal to the cost of a shipment to 
New York, but you couldn't get it up country. When you got it up 
country, you couldn't use the machinery we had put in. For ex­
ample, we had a system of workshops for producing iron tools for 
the farmer to improve his tools and production. We had a big work­
flhop and tool plant for each province. One of the tool plants was 
coming in crates off a barge; and you had to have a cement founda­
tion for the tools. This meant a big local outlay, a lot of expense, 
increasing the inflation and placing a heavy burden on the local 
people to provide the foundation, even before you got the crates 
unpacked. To get into production you have to train operators and 
find them also. 
Furthermore, we lacked experience in regard to the Chinese 
political tradition. We didn't understand the mandate of Heaven. 
The mandate of Heaven is an old Confucian conception, engraved 
in Chinese psychology, like the election process in the United 
States. One candidate in our presidential election gets a few more 
votes. He may actually get less votes, but he still gets more 
electoral votes, as at times in the past. He gets a few more votes 
and the rest of the country the next morning says, "He is the Presi­
dent." That's the majority rule, a bare majority sometimes. That is 
our custom. The mandate in Heaven is comparable. The idea is 
that, when a new contender for the supreme power obviously has 
popular support organized by using a combination of persuasion 
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and compulsion to work on the peasantry; he is nice to them; and 
those who are nice to you, you knock off, and there are others who 
are still nicer to you, and there are fewer of them to knock off. You 
get them lined up; you get them organized, and so on. When a 
· 1eader in China has done this, there comes a point where he has
the mandate of Heaven. He is in-he is the new dynastic organizer.
That situation came back last Christmas. Chiang Kai-shek has
been out ever since. When the leader is out, he is completely out,
and it is just a case of clean up. So it has been impossible for
us, whatever efforts we have made, to build up any strength against
the Communists.
I think we have to be more consicious of our own type of 
strength, our own type of society-its own virtue. And it is a 
virtue in my view that consists of pluralism which, I feel, is a fancy 
word for a lot of agencies or expressions of power in the state, or 
having a diversified situation where there is no one dominant force, 
as exhibited in our having not only a public sector of government 
enterprises, but a private sector of private enterprises. And some­
times they are pretty big, but, nevertheless, these big corporations 
which the Marxists stare at as monopoly capitalism, are not govern­
ment. They are something different and provide a sort of balance, 
so that we have in our system an element of strength with the 
balance which we have from a number of different agencies on the 
same level. And that, I think, goes with our whole concept of the 
rule of law, including private property, which safeguards the indi­
vidual in his self expression. There is an idea there of not having 
the monolithic state where the party is a dictatorship, where the 
state does all the industrializing and· the like. This doesn't mean 
that I am anti-socialist or pro-socialist. I think we are moving 
along in a progression (this is just my personal view)-progression 
where we are developing an increasing degree of government en­
terprise. But I think it is important for us to keep in mind this 
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principle of a balance among the forces in our society so that no 
one agency, association, or group is dominant. 
Now, when we look at the Chinese scene, and most of the 
other Asiatic countries, it is perfectly obvious that they are not in 
such a situation and they cannot be, no matter how much we try. 
Say we are going to help the middle class; it isn't the same thing. 
And they are not our kind, in these sociological terms; there is 
nothing much we can do about it. They do have this tradition of 
the official class running things. The Japanese have it, and getting 
them away from the idea is going to take a long time. We have 
to compromise in a statesman-like sense, of retaining our own ob­
jectives and:our own values and yet not assuming that we can make 
them prevail in the near future. You can't just go out and Ameri­
canize Asia. When you do, you stub your toe as we have in the 
recent past, unless, of course, you look around for the person who 
will play ball with us, who does subscribe to American principles. 
You find a Syngman Rhee in Korea or a Chiang Kai-shek in China. 
Our danger is that we are too ambitious about this, that we go in 
and support these people and say, "You've got to choose-this is our 
man. He is most like us, at least. he is not a Communist, so we will 
support him." Well, I'm afraid of that, as a practical matter, not 
being effective. I think it is not going to work too well, if we are 
too ambitious about it. It works something like this. Chiang Kai­
shek is on the spot, with a very tough post-war situation, inflation, 
many difficulties to overcome, everybody unhappy; and, if he does 
certain things to try to win peasant support, maybe he can under­
cut the Communists. He has had his chance for twenty years; it's 
still there, but in 1945 and 1946 we came along and we said, "Yes, 
you must make these reforms and we will give you a lot of aid." 
And . he says to himself, consciously or unconsciously, "O. K., I'll 
take.the aid and won't have to make the reforms, because if I make 
the reforms, I will be out, so I will take the aid." So the more aid 
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we give him, the less he has. to make reforms, the less capable he 
is of competing with these Communists, or other people who are 
out organizing the peasantry on the countryside through reform. 
In effect, we give him the "Kiss of Death" to some extent. We can 
do that in any country in Asia, if we go in too heavily. We have got 
to figure out some way of trying to support a non-Communist situ­
ation without actually creating it. We can't back the status quo; 
we can't put people in positions where they rely on us and become, 
as the Communists say, "Running dogs of the American Imperial­
ists", in the eyes of their own people, which discredits them and 
pushes them out. 
To throw this out as a point-I think we are not going to 
get very far with a big anti-Communism ideological line in Asia. 
I think we will get a lot farther with an anti-Russian ideological 
line. In other words, we should avoid being doctrinaired. 
Now it is very good for us to work out our own doctrines, 
our own faith, what we believe in in this country. Obviously, this 
country isn't going Communist. We want to understand what our 
ideology is and express it, believe it, but, when it comes to Asia, 
Asia is so different and is so close to being a setup for the Com­
munists, I think we would do well to lay off Communism and lay on
Russia. You see Communism is the fine dream. It is the thing 
you can do in �sia-to knock off the landlord or kick out the in­
vader, who is the imperialist by Communist definition. Commun­
ism is a pretty good thing. to the poor down-trodden Asiatic, just 
as an ideology to dream about, to work for. "All stand together 
and we will have a new day; we'll liberate; everything will be 
fine." It works as a rallying point, and attacking it, I don't think, 
is our strong point. On the other hand, if we go in for an anti­
Russian line, we've got all kinds of material. There are the Russians 
sitting in Manchuria, doing all kinds of dirty work in the back-
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